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STATE TAXATION OF EXPORTS::
THE STREAM OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
LESLIE W. ABRAMSONt
In May, 1974, the United States Supreme Court decided the case
of Kosydar v. National Cash Register Co.' This was the first decision
in twenty-five years that considered on the merits a state tax challenged
as violative of the import-export clause of the United States Consti-
tution.2 The Court strictly limited the tax exemption provided by the
Constitution, consistent with its decisions of a quarter century before.
In fact, Kosydar quoted from and relied upon an 1886 case, Coe v.
Errol,3 thereby demonstrating a consistency of constitutional reason-
ing over a period of almost ninety years that may seem remarkable.
Subsequent to Coe, two cases indicated that the Court's reasoning was
moving toward a broader interpretation of the export tax exemption,4
but two 1949 cases reversed that trend.5 The present unanimous view
of strictly limiting tax immunity under the import-export clause is in
accord with the intentions of the Constitution's Framers, who never
intended exports to enjoy broad freedom from state taxation.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In analyzing the export tax prohibition imposed on the states by
article I, section 10,' the specific evils sought to be eliminated by the
Framers must be considered, particularly with respect to the failure of
the Articles of Confederation to provide an effective national govern-
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Louisville; J.D., University of Michi-
gan 1971; A.B., Cornell University, 1968. The valuable contribution of Cecil J. Olin-
stead III, a first year law student at the University of Louisville, is hereby acknowledged.
1. 417 U.S. 62 (1974), see text accompanying notes 52-56 infra.
2. No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or
Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for
executing its Inspection Laws, and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts
laid by any State on Imports or Exports shall be for the Use of the Treasury
of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and
Controul of the Congress.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
3. 116 U.S. 517 (1886).
4. Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69 (1946); A.G.
Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards, 262 U.S. 66 (1923).
5. Joy Oil Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 337 U.S. 286 (1949); Empresa Siderurgica
v. County of Merced, 337 U.S. 154 (1949).
6. See note 2 supra.
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ment, especially where commerce was involved. 7 In The Federalist,
James Madison stated:
The defect of power in the existing Confederacy to regulate
the commerce between its several members, is in the number of
those which have been clearly pointed out by experience....
A very material object of this power was the relief of the States
which import and export through other States, from the improper
contributions levied on them by the latter. Were these at liberty
to regulate the trade between State and State, it must be foreseen
that ways would be found out to load the articles of import and
export, during the passage through their jurisdiction, with duties
which would fall on the makers of the latter and the consumers of
the former.
8
Since the commercial interests of the various sections of the country
were not in accord, it was necessary to insert certain safeguards in the
proposed constitution to provide an arrangement acceptable to all of
the sectional interests represented at the Constitutional Convention of
1787. The export tax prohibitions appearing in article I, section 9,
clause 59 and article I, section 10, clause 2 are such safeguards of sec-
tional commercial interests.
The constitutional evolution of the present article I, section 9,
clause 5 involved a sectional struggle. In the summer of 1787, at the
time of the Constitutional Convention, the northern states had become
the shipping center of the nation while the southern states were the
chief producers of exports. The southern states were fearful that a
congress controlled by the more numerous northern states would im-
pose burdensome levies on these exports. The demand of the southern
states for economic protection was first raised by Charles Pinckney of
South Carolina on July 23, 1787. According to Madison's notes
of the Convention: "Genl. Pinckney reminded the Convention that if
the Committee [of Detail] should fail to insert some security to the
Southern States agst. an emancipation of slaves, and taxes on exports,
7. See generally Tim FEDmEAIST Nos. 15-22 (A. Hamilton).
In addition to the defects already enumerated in the existing federal sys-
tem, there are others of not less importance, which concur in rendering it al-
together unfit for the administration of the affairs of the Union.
The want of a power to regulate commerce is by all parties allowed to
be of the number. . . . It is indeed evident, on the most superficial view, that
there is no object, either as it respects the interests of trade or finance, that
more strongly demands a federal superintendence.
Tim FFmn .RisT No. 22, at 191 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
8. Id. No. 42, at 305.
9. "No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9.
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he shd. be bound by duty to his State to vote agst. their Report."10 When
the Committee of Detail delivered its report to the Convention on
August 6, 1787, article VII, section 4 provided that "[n]o tax or duty
shall be laid by the Legislature on articles exported from any State."1'
When article VII was taken up by the entire Convention on August
16, 1787, George Mason of Virginia urged prohibition of any power
of the national government to tax exports.' 2 However, this was opposed
by Madison and Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania, who felt that
taxation of exports was a proper power to be vested in the new national
government. Madison argued that "it would be unjust to the States
whose produce was exported by their neighbors to leave it subject to
be taxed by the latter."'3 Other delegates were concerned that the
power to tax exports would be exercised improperly if granted to the
national government. "Mr. Gerry [of Massachusetts] thought the [na-
tional] legislature could not be trusted with such a power [to tax ex-
ports]. It might ruin the Country. It might be exercised partially,
raising one and depressing another part of it."' 4
It was not until August 21, 1787, almost as an afterthought, that
the idea of forbidding the states to tax exports was conceived. On that
date, when article VII, section 4 was again taken up by the entire Con-
vention, there was objection by the inland states' delegates that denial
to the national government of a power to tax exports would still leave
the states free to tax each other's exports.' 5 Thereafter, "Mr. Langdon
[of New Hampshire] suggested a prohibition on the States from taxing
the produce of other States exported from their harbours,"' but this
was not accepted. On August 28, when article XII of the Committee
10. 2 T)Hm RECORDS OF ThE FEDERAL CONVENTON 95 (M. Farrand ed. 1934) (foot-
notes omitted).
11. Id. at 183.
12. Mr. Mason urged the necessity of connecting with the power of levying
taxes duties &c, that no tax should be laid on exports. He was unwilling to
trust to its being done in a future article. He hoped the Nothn. States did not
mean to deny the Southern this security. It would hereafter be as desirable
to the former when the later should become most populous. He professed his
jealousy for the productions of the Southern or as he called them, the staple
States.
Id. at 305-06.
13. Id. at 306. Madison also contended that "the power of taxing exports is proper
in itself, and as the states cannot with propriety exercise it separately, it ought to be
vested in them collectively." Id.
14. Id. at 307.
15. The Convention was called for May 14, 1787, but lacked enough delegates to
begin work until May 25. The Convention adjourned on September 17, 1787. Thus,
not until less than three weeks before adjournment was any proposal made to forbid state
taxation of exports. Id. at 352-65, 641-50.
16. Id. at 361.
1975]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
of Detail's report was being considered,"" Rufus King of Massachusetts
moved to amend the article to prohibit the states from taxing exports
as well as imports,'" and this amendment passed. On September 12
it was proposed by Mason and seconded by Madison that states be
permitted to tax exports to the extent of defraying the expenses of
executing their various inspection laws.' 9 That provision was included
in the report of the Committee of Style on September 12.20 The final
wording of what is now article I, section 10, clause 2 of the Constitu-
tion was adopted on September 15 on the motion of Mason.2'
In discussing the rationale of article I, section 10, clause 2 before
the Virginia convention, Madison made it clear that the primary pur-
pose of the state export tax prohibition was to prevent discriminatory
taxes from being laid on goods produced in other than the exporting
state.
Some states export the produce of other states. Virginia exports
the produce of North Carolina; Pennsylvania those of Jersey and
Delaware; and Rhode Island those of Connecticut and Massachu-
setts. The exporting states wished to retain the power of laying
duties on exports, to enable them to pay the expenses incurred. The
states whose produce is exported by other states, were extremely
jealous, lest a contribution should be raised of them by the export-
ing states, by laying heavy duties on their commodities. If this
clause be fully considered, it will be found to be more consistent
with justice and equity than any other practicable mode: For if
the states had the exclusive imposition of duties on exports, they
might raise a heavy contribution of the other states, for their own
exclusive emoluments.22
There was no design to proteot exports from all taxation; rather
the clause was intended to prevent discriminatory taxation among the
states, which Congress could not prevent through the exercise of its
17. Article XII stated that "[njo State shall coin money; nor grant letters or
marque and reprisals; nor enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; nor grant any
title of Nobility." Id. at 187.
18. Id. at 442.
19. Id. at 588-89, 605.
20. "No state shall, without the consent of Congress, lay imposts or duties on im-
ports or exports, nor with such consent, but to the use of the treasury of the United
States. . . ." Id. at 597.
21. Id. at 624. The final version of this clause included the word "any" following
the words "[n]o state shall, without the consent of Congress, lay .... " The more
significant addition to Mason's provision was to allow a state to lay imposts and duties
on imports or exports which were "absolutely necessary for executing" the state's inspec-
tion laws. Id.
22. 3 id. at 328-29.
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powers under the commerce clause.23
Historically, then, the article I, section 9, clause 5 prohibition was
designed to protect the southern states, which were fearful that a con-
gress controlled by the northern states would unfairly tax southern ex-
ports, while the provisions of article I, section 10, clause 2 were de-
signed to protect the inland states from discriminatory taxation by the
states through which their goods passed in the exportation process.
There can be no doubt that these clauses were inserted in the Constitu-
tion to protect sectional commercial interests, and were not intended
for the direct benefit of exporters.
EARLY JUDIcIAL INTERPRETATION
Definitive judicial interpretation of the export aspects of article I,
section 10, clause 2 is generally considered to have 'begun with the
leading case of Coe v. Errol.24 However, there were export cases prior
to 1886 that warrant discussion.
In Clarke v. Clarke25 a circuit court resolved attacks on a state
ad valorem property tax levied on certain logs owned by a British
subject and held for export to Europe. The logs had been inspected
for export (apparently a requirement of Georgia law) and were merely
awaiting the arrival of transportation when tax day fell. After the
logs were exported without payment of the tax, the tax collector levied
execution upon other property of the complainant, whereupon the com-
plainant initiated an action for trespass, claiming the logs were exports
and exempt from taxation under article I, section 10, clause 2 of the
Constitution. The circuit court agreed.
The logs on which the tax was levied were the property of, and
were in possession of persons engaged exclusively in exporting
timber to foreign countries, they were purchased from citizens of
Georgia for the purpose of exportation, they were in a port of the
United States awaiting shipment, they had been inspected according
to the laws of the state, and the purpose of the owners to export the
logs was, after the levy of the tax thereon, actually carried out and
the logs were exported.
26
The state claimed that the tax was levied upon the general mass of
property within the state and, hence, not subject to the constitutional
23. "The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign Na-
tions, and among the several States... ... U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
24. 116 U.S. 517 (1886).
25. 5 F. Cas. 943 (No. 2846) (C.C.S.D. Ga. 1877).
26. Id. at 944.
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prohibition. But the court disposed of this argument by finding that
such an interpretation would defeat the purpose of the clause because
it would allow the state to evade the prohibition by giving the tax an-
other name or by changing the manner of levying the tax.27
The case of Blount v. Munroe28 arose in a state court on very
similar facts. Munroe, like Clarke, was a subject of Great Britain who
was temporarily residing in Georgia for the purpose of engaging in the
business of purchasing and shipping timber to European markets. At
no time did Munroe sell timber in the United States. Certain timber
owned by Munroe was in the port of Darien, Georgia on tax day and an
ad valorem property tax was imposed upon it. At the time the tax
was imposed all of the timber was under a contract of sale to foreign
purchasers, and it was all exported subsequently. In his complaint
Munroe argued the tax was prohibited by the import-export clause.
The state contended that the tax was valid because it was a general tax
imposed equally on all property within the state, rather than specifically
on exports. The court held for the complainant, finding that the timber
was an export on tax day. Factors supporting this finding were: 1)
the timber was in the hands of exporters engaged solely in the export
business, 2) the timber was awaiting shipment under contract of sale
to persons in England, and 3) the timber was actually shipped abroad
subsequent to the imposition of the tax. The court further found that
the exporter had done all he could do to export the timber, and was
merely awaiting the arrival, of ships upon which to load it, The court
stated:
It cannot be the meaning of -the clause [article I, section 10,
clause 2] of the constitution that it [the timber] becomes an export
when on shipboard, and not before ....
It [article I, section 10, clause 2] ,was put in the constitution,
it is true, to check the power of the seaboard states, and to pro-
tect the interior states in the egress of their goods to the markets of
the world; but when engrafted upon the constitution, to carry out
ithe object had in contemplation, the clause was made general, so
as to prohibit the states from taxing any export, and thus to prevent
any trouble or uncertainty in ascertaining whence the product
came-narrowing the investigation to a single question: is the
article taxed an export?29
Implicit in Clarke and Blount is the determination that goods are tax
27. Id. at 944-45.
28. 60 Ga. 61 (1878).
29. Id. at 65-68.
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exempt as exports when the court finds intent to export plus physicial
movement in furtherance of that intent.
The United States Supreme Court first spoke on the problem of
state taxation of exports in the case of Brown v. Houston,30 in which
a city property tax was upheld as applied to coal held for sale, some
of which was sold to a foreign steamship. Plaintiffs were residents of,
and primarily doing business in, Pennsylvania. They consigned a barge-
load of coal, which they had mined and paid taxes on in Pennsylvania,
to their agent in New Orleans to sell for their account. When the chal-
lenged tax was levied, the coal was upon a barge afloat in the Missis-
sippi River. Subsequent to the imposition of the tax, about half the coal
was "exported" on foreign steamboats (apparently for use by the steam-
boats rather than for resale in foreign markets) and the remainder sold
to domestic purchasers. In upholding the tax the Court noted that,
when taxed, the coal was not held with the intent or for the purpose of
exportation, but rather with the intent and for the purpose of sale in
New Orleans. The Court stated:
A duty on exports must either be a duty levied on goods as a
condition, or by reason of their exportation, or, at least, a direct
tax or duty on goods which are intended for exportation.... But
certainly, where -a general tax is laid on all property alike, it can-
not be construed as a duty on exports when falling upon goods not
then intended for exportation, though they should happen -to be ex-
ported afterwards. 31
A common thread of legal reasoning connects these early cases:
there must be an intent to export the article for which the tax exempt
status is claimed under article I, section 10, clause 2. In Clarke and
Blount the articles were moved to the seaport with the intent and for
the purpose of exporting them, while in Brown the fact that the coal
was held for sale to any purchasers, domestic or foreign, prevented its
classification as an export. Thus, the lack of intent to export the coal
en mass was considered sufficient to permit the levying of a nondis-
criminatory property tax.
INTENT
As indicated above, one early Supreme Court decision held that
intent is a sine qua non for tax exemption under the import-export
30. 114 U.S. 622 (1885).
31. Id. at 629-30.
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clause,32 while other decisions 3 held that intent to export plus physical
movement in furtherance of that intent will confer constitutional tax
exemption on the goods. At the present time the Supreme Court con-
siders the 1886 case of Coe v. Erro 4 to be the "seminal case ' 35 dealing
with state taxation of exports. In Coe the Court held that the owner's
intent to export the goods, even coupled with partial preparation to do
so, was insufficient to exempt those goods from state taxation. The
case involved certain timber cut in New Hampshire, which had been
collected in the town of Errol, New Hampshire for about a year await-
ing a sufficient level of water in the Androgscoggin River to allow the
logs to be floated to Maine." Speaking for the Court in upholding an
ad valorem tax on the logs, Mr. Justice Bradley disposed of the argu-
ment that the owner's intent to export the logs, standing alone, should
confer tax immunity by stating that:
Though intended for exportation, they [the logs] may never be ex-
ported; the owner has a perfect right to change his mind; and until
actually put in motion, for some place out of the State, or commit-
ted to the custody of a carrier for transportation to such place, why
may they not be regarded as still remaining a part of the general
mass of property in the State?
... Until actually launched on its way to another State, or
committed to a common carrier for transportation to such state,
its destination is not fixed and certainY8
The Supreme Court, then, decided that physical movement of the goods
in the process of exportation was necessary to remove them from the
general mass of taxable property within the state. The owner's intent
was relevant only insofar as it could be demonstrated by actual move-
ment of the goods; the owner's subjective state of mind, by itself, was
not determinative of the validity of the state tax as applied to the
owner. Accordingly, the Court's rationale seems to have been that
the owner could show his intent to irrevocably commit the timber to
export only by entering it into the process of actual movement out of
the taxing state. Therefore, in Coe, the movement of the logs from the
32. Brown v. Houston, 114 U.S. 622 (1885).
33. Clarke v. Clarke, 5 F. Cas. 943 (No. 2846) (C.C.S.D. Ga. 1877); Blount v.
Munroe, 60 Ga. 61 (1878).
34. 116 U.S. 517 (1886).
35. Kosydar v. National Cash Register Co., 417 U.S. 62, 66 (1974).
36. Coe was a case involving interstate commerce rather than exportation of goods
out of the country. For a comparison of the commerce clause with the import-export
clause see Comment, Constitutional Law: Sales Tax on Fuel for Ships' Stores Valid
Under Import-Export Clause, 51 MnIN. L. RPv. 151, 156 (1966).
37. 116 U.S. at 526-28.
[Vol. 54
TAXATION OF EXPORTS
forests of New Hampshire to the banks of the Androgscoggin River in
the same state did not commence movement out of the taxing state and
was constitutionally insufficient to confer immunity from the taxing
power of the state. The Court viewed its task as setting a "point of
time when State jurisdiction over the commodities of commerce begins
and ends,"3 8 stating that:
Such goods do not cease to be part of the general mass of property
in the State, subject, as such, to its jurisdiction, and to taxation
in the usual way, until they have been shipped, or entered with a
common carrier for transportation to another State, or have started
upon such transportation in a continuous route or journey.39
The next major case dealing with a claimed exemption under the
import-export clause is A. G. Spalding & Brothers v. Edwards.40 This
case involved a federal excise tax as applied to the sale of bats and
baseballs to the New York agent of a Venezuelan company for export
to Venezuela. The Supreme Court invalidated the application of the
tax, holding that the sale by Spalding to the New York agent was the
first step in the exportation process itself and that the transaction was
therefore exempt from state taxation. In defining the point at which
the goods acquired the status of exports, the Court decided that mere
subjective intent failed to establish such status, holding that "while the
goods were in process of manufacture they were none the less subject
to taxation [even] if they were intended for export and made with speci-
fic reference to foreign wants."41  This holding is entirely consistent
with Coe and the earlier cases. 42
The Supreme Court concerned itself extensively with the element
of intent in Empresa Siderurgica v. County of Merced,43 but again held
38. Id. at 526, cited with approval in Kosydar v. National Cash Register Co., 417
U.S. 62, 66 (1974).
39. Id. at 527.
40. 262 U.S. 66 (1923).
41. Id. at 69.
42. But see Cornell v. Coyne, 192 U.S. 418, 427-28 (1904) (emphasis added),
where the Court, in discussing article I, section 9, clause 5 and article I, section 10,
clause 2 stated "[tihe prohibition in both cases has reference to the imposition of duties
on goods by reason or because of their exportation or intended exportation, or whilst
they are being exported." This dictum is not reconcilable with the other cases dealing
with intent, since the position set forth above implies that subjective intent alone would
be sufficient to confer export exemption for goods merely intended for eventual exporta-
tion.
43. 337 U.S. 154 (1949). While not directly addressing the issue of subjective in-
tent in Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69 (1946), the Su-
preme Court did hold that the crucial element in determining when the export process
had started is "[the certainty that the goods are headed to sea." Id. at 82. The cer-
tainty that the goods are headed to sea requires their physical movement. The intent
1975]
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that intent to export would not immunize goods from state taxation
under the import-export clause. In that case a South American firm
purchased a California cement factory, which was to be dismantled and
shipped to Colombia. An export license was obtained and a letter
of credit in favor of the seller was deposited in the United States. Title
passed to the purchaser, whose agents took possession of the plant. A
common carrier began to dismantle the plant and to package it for ship-
ment abroad. After a portion of the plant had actually been exported,
an ad valorem property tax was imposed on the portion still remaining
in California. In upholding the tax, Mr. Justice Douglas stated:
Under that test [of Coe v. Errol] it is not enough that there is
an intent to export, or a plan which contemplates exportation, or
an integrated series of events which will end with it.... It is the
entrance of the articles into the export stream that marks the start
of the process of exportation. Then there is cer-tainty that the goods
are headed for their foreign destination and will not be diverted to
domestic use. Nothing less will suffice.
So in this case it is not enough that on -the tax date there was
a purpose and plan to export this property. Nor is it sufficient that
in due course that plan was fully executed. 44
Even in dissent Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated that "[a]ffirmance
would be amply supported by bare citation of cases holding that intent
to export, no matter how firm, is not by itself enough to confer im-
munity from taxation. ' 45 However, he would have remanded for a
determination of whether the disassembled plant constituted an organic
unit, such that shipment of part would make virtually certain shipment
of the whole.
46
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's views on the insufficiency of intent alone
to invoke tax immunity under the import-export clause were again
voiced when he spoke for the majority in Joy Oil Co. v. State Tax Com-
mission,47 in which a state ad valorem tax was sustained. In 1945, Joy
Oil Co., a Canadian corporation, purchased 1.5 million gallons of gaso-
of the owner ultimately to export them, prior to the movement, was at least impliedly
deemed insufficient to confer immunity from taxation upon them by the Richfield Court.
Cf. id. at 78-82.
44. 337 U.S. at 156. The Empresa Siderurgica Court stated the test for state taxa-
tion of goods as follows: "goods do not cease to be part of the general mass of property
in the State, subject, as such, to its jurisdiction, and to taxation in the usual way, until
they have been shipped, or entered with a common carrier for transportation to another
State, or have been started upon such transportation in a continuous route or journey."
Id., quoting Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517, 527 (1886).
45. Id. at 161 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 159 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
47. 337 U.S. 286 (1949).
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line from Mid-West Refineries, Inc. in Grand Rapids, Michigan. The
bills of lading were marked "For Export Only." The gasoline was stored
by Joy Oil Co. in leased tanks in Dearborn, Mich., and 50,000 gallons
were actually transported from Dearborn to Canada by truck before a
federal law was passed prohibiting the transportation of inflammables
over international bridges. As shipment by rail was too expensive, Joy
Oil Co. elected to transport the remaining gasoline to Canada by water,
but a shortage of ships forced the gasoline to remain in storage in Dear-
born for fifteen months, during which time the ad valorem tax was levied.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for a majority of six, held that intent
to export, even when coupled with partial exportation, failed to confer
tax immunity on the gasoline still stored in the tanks on "tax day."
Citing Cornell v. Coyne48 and Empresa Siderurgica, the Court stated,
"[t]he circumstances which tended, at the time when the tax was assessed,
to establish petitioner's intent to export the gasoline and the fact that the
gasoline was eventually exported are not enough, by themselves, to con-
fer immunity from local taxation."49
In a vigorous dissent urging that the tax should have been invali-
dated, Chief Justice Vinson argued:
[T]he Court concedes that petitioner intended to export the
gasoline at the time the tax was imposed, and petitioner's uncon-
tradicted evidence shows that it had that intent throughout the
period of delay, which was caused by its inability to produce water
transportation....
The result is that the Court, without consideration of the fact
that the gasoline had been started on its journey with the intent that
it be transshipped for immediate export to Canada, holds that fif-
teen months' unavoidable delay is so pioductive of uncertainty that
process of exportation ceases as a matter of law.50
In light of the prior cases, this dissent could be considered the high
water mark of the theory that subjective intent should be determinative
of exemption from state taxation under the import-export clause.
Joy Oil Co. had established its intent to export the oil, but the majority
dealt directly and conclusively with the intent element and found it in-
sufficient to provide any tax immunity for the gasoline.51
48. 192 U.S. 418 (1904). The use of Cornell does not-seem to support the hold-
ing, since that case at least implies that intent alone might be sufficient to confer im-
munity from taxation. See note 42 supra.
49. 337 U.S. at 288.
50. Id. at 289-92 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
51. See also Rice Growers' Ass'n v. County of Yolo, 17-Cal. App. 3d 227, 94 Cal.
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In its most recent decision concerning a challenge to a state ad
valorem tax as violative of the import-export clause, the Supreme Court
refused to modify its holding in Empresa Siderurgica to allow certainty
of export to be demonstrated in any manner other than by actual entry
of the goods into the export stream. In Kosydar v. National Cash Regis-
ter Co.52 the taxpayer was storing in an Ohio warehouse certain ma-
chines designed, ordered and manufactured for use in foreign countries.
These machines, according to evidence introduced by NCR, were in
no way usable in the United States, and were being held pending
completion of administrative details incident to shipment abroad when
an ad valorem tax was levied upon them. The Court phrased the issue
in a manner that excluded the subjective intent of NCR as a relevant
factor, stating:
the essential problem in cases involving the constitutional prohibi-
tion against taxation of exports has therefore been to decide whether
a sufficient commencement of the process of exportation has oc-
curred so as to immunize the article at issue from state taxation.
Of necessity the inquiry has usually been a faclual one.54
The Court further noted that "at least some such entrance [into the
export stream] is a prerequisite to the [Import-Export] Clause's opera-
tion."55
Quoting from Empresa Siderurgica and Joy Oil Co., the Court dis-
regarded National Cash Register's clear intent to export the goods,
stating that "[o]ur prior cases have determined that the protections of
the Import-Export Clause are not available until the article at issue be-
gins its physical entry into the stream of exportation. We find no rea-
son to depart from that settled doctrine." 56
Therefore, it appears that the Supreme Court views intent, with-
out accompanying physical movement of the goods, as inadequate to
protect the goods from state taxation under the import-export clause.
This is not to say that intent to export is totally irrelevant, for as Brown
points out, entry into the export stream without intent will not confer im-
munity from state taxation. 7 But it does seem accurate to state that
Rptr. 847 (Ct. App. 1971), where a clear intent to export specially milled rice not sell-
able in the United States was proved, but the court held that "[an intention to export
does not bar general ad valorem taxation." Id. at 234, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 851.
52. 417 U.S. 62 (1974).
53. Id. at 64 & n.3.
54. Id. at 67 (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 68.
56. Id. at 71.
57. See text accompanying notes 30-31 supra.
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placing the goods irrevocably into the export stream is the only judicially
cognizable manner in which intent to export can be demonstrated. Al-
though the rule may be somewhat harsh and overly mechanical in indi-
vidual instances, the exclusion of subjective intent as a relevant factor
gives the courts and state taxing authorities a test which is easy to apply.
Under this approach the courts and taxing agencies must examine only
the degree and extent of physical movement of the goods in question
to determine if exportation has begun. Inquiry into these factors,
though not always a simple task, at least may provide more predict-
ability than examination of the owner-taxpayer's state of mind.
CERTAINTY OF EXPORT
As discussed above, the Supreme Court has rejected subjective
criteria as a basis for determining the applicability of the import-export
clause. 58 However, there are other, more "objective" indicia, which the
Court has alluded to in its decisions. One of these is the certainty that
the goods will eventually be exported even though they are not actually
in the export stream when taxed. This element has also been con-
sidered in terms of the potential for diversion of the goods to domestic
use prior to exportation.
In Spalding the alleged taxable event was the manufacturer's de-
livery of baseballs and bats to the domestic agent of a foreign pur-
chaser. 9 At the time of that delivery, which occurred within the
United States, movement out of the country had not yet begun, so the
alleged taxable event occurred before the goods had entered the export
stream by commencing movement to a foreign destination. Therefore,
the tax would appear valid if the "physical movement" test of Coe were
strictly applied. But the tax was stricken. Mr. Justice Holmes, speak-
ing for a unanimous Court, stated: "[tihe question is whether the sale
was a step in exportation assuming, as appears to be the fact, that the
title passed at the moment when the goods were delivered into the
carrier's hands . . ... 0 He also noted that if the transaction had
been entirely domestic the taxable event would have been the "act that
passed the title." However, since that very act "committed the goods
to the carrier that was to take them across the sea," '61 they had already
58. See text accompanying notes 43-51 supra.
59. See text accompanying notes 40-42 supra. This was an article I, section 9,
clause 5 case, but the same principles are also applied to import-export clause cases.
60. 262 U.S. at 68-69.
61. Id. at 69.
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started on their journey abroad at that point and were properly classi-
fied as exports. It was further recognized that the domestic agent could
have diverted the bats and balls to domestic use, but this possibility
was summarily dismissed by the conclusion that "[t]here was not the
slightest probability of any such change and it did not occur."82
The above-quoted language indicates that once the goods have
been acted upon in such a manner as to make ultimate exportation
virtually certain, the constitutional immunity from state taxation will
apply. However, the holding in Spalding may not be so radical a
departure from the Coe doctrine as it might appear, for there was physi-
cal movement when the manufacturer delivered the goods to the pur-
chaser's carrier, and this action could have easily been construed as
the point where the goods began their continuous journey to a foreign
port. Thus, the same result could have been reached by application of
a pure physical movement test had the Court so desired. Nonetheless,
Spalding does provide a basis for assuming that mere "certainty of ex-
port" is sufficient to confer immunity from taxation upon the goods.
The possibility of a departure from the physical movement test
appeared again in Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board of Equalization,"'
in which the seller's act of pumping oil into the foreign purchaser's ship
was sufficient to provide exemption from a state sales tax. The Rich-
field Court apparently conceived the holding in Spalding as being based
upon the ground of certainty of export, and dealt with that issue at
length, noting that:
[W]hen the oil was pumped into the hold of the vessel, it passed
into the control of a foreign purchaser and there was nothing
equivocal in the transaction which created even a probability that
the oil would be diverted to domestic use. It would not be clearer
that the oil had started upon its export journey had it been deliv-
ered to a common carrier at an inland point. The means of ship-
ment are unimportant so long as the certainty of the foreign desti-
nation is plain.
It seems clear... that the commencement of the export would
occur no later than the delivery of the oil into the vessel. 64
From this passage it appears that the ratio decidendi of Richfield
was the certainty that the oil would be exported. But again, the situa-
tion was such that the certainty of export was demonstrated by some
physical movement, which occurred when the oil was pumped into the
62. Id. at 70.
63. 329 U.S. 69 (1946).
64. Id. at 83.
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purchaser's ship. It seems that application of the Coe physical move-
ment test would have sufficed to invalidate the tax without need for
the Court to involve itself with an analysis of the oil's diversion poten-
tial. But, when Spalding and Richfield are considered together, they
do imply that the import-export clause immunity could obtain in the
absence of physical movement of the taxed goods if the certainty of
export were positively established by some other means. However,
the Supreme Court began a return to a strict physical movement test
for invalidation of state taxes in Empresa Siderurgica, although the fac-
tor of certainty of export was again mentioned.65 But, in accordance
with Coe, the Court would only recognize certainty of export once the
goods had physically entered the export stream.
Any lingering implications that certainty of export alone would
confer tax immunity were unequivocally negated by the Court in the
Kosydar decision, 6 which rests squarely on the Coe physical movement
test. In Kosydar the taxed goods were designed for exclusive over-
seas use and were not even operable in the United States. A clearer
certainty of ultimate export and a more complete absence of diversion
potential would be difficult to envision. The machines were taxed
while stored in a warehouse in Ohio prior to their movement out of
the country. The tax was sustained because of this absence of actual
physical movement, despite the certainty that the machines would be
exported at some future date."
Although Spalding and Richfield may have signified the beginning
of a broader judicial application of constitutional immunities for ex-
ports, Empresa Siderurgica and Kosydar constitute a complete repudia-
tion of any such broadening, and a return to physical movement as the
overriding criterion for tax exemption. As with the taxpayer's sub-
65. The tax immunity runs to the process of exportation and the transactions
and documents embraced in it. . . . Delivery of packages to an export-
ing carrier for shipment abroad [citing Spalding], and the delivery of oil
into the hold of the ship furnished by the purchaser to carry the oil abroad
[citing Richfield], have been held sufficient. It is the entrance of the articles
into the export stream that marks the start of the process of exportation. Then
there is certainty that the goods are headed for their foreign destination and
will not be diverted to domestic use. Nothing less will suffice.
337 U.S. at 156-57 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
66. See text accompanying notes 52-56 supra. See also Rice Growers' Ass'n v.
County of Yolo, 17 Cal. App. 3d 227, 94 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1971), which foreshadowed
the result in Kosydar.
67. 417 U.S. 62, 70 (1974). The Court quoted from Empresa Siderurgica in sup-
port of the position that certainty of export is not the same as commencement of the
exportation process, and stated that only the latter will confer constitutional tax im-
munity upon the goods. Id.
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jective intent, certainty of export may be considered a relevant factor
only insofar as it can be demonstrated by physical movement of the
taxed goods.
LEAVING THE COUNTRY AND CONTINUITY OF JOURNEY
Once goods have left the United States destined for a foreign coun-
try they are exports and thus exempt from state taxation. But this is
not to say that all goods which leave the country become exports,08
and certainly the status of "export" is not conferred retroactively upon'
taxed goods by virtue of the fact that they are subsequently shipped'
abroad. Once the goods have entered the export stream by commenc-
ing their final journey to a foreign destination, then, and only then, do
they become exports in the constitutional sense. Problems can arise,
though, when the journey is interrupted before the goods leave the
country, and a state tax is imposed during the period of interruption.
Although Spalding arguably implies that mere passage of title in
the goods to a foreign purchaser starts them on their journey, the later
decisions in Empresa Siderurgica and Kosydar require actual move-
ment of the goods as an absolute prerequisite to immunity from taxa-
tion. However, it is possible that factors such as passage of title from
a domestic seller to a foreign buyer might reduce the degree of physical
movement necessary for the goods to acquire tax immunity. For ex-
ample, in Richfield the title to the oil passed at the time it was de-
livered into the hold of the purchaser's ship.09 Had the seller retained
title after delivery it is possible that the California tax would have been
sustained. The importance of the passage of title to the Richfield re-
sult is emphasized by the treatment of that factor in the dissent of Mr.
Justice Black, who argued that the taxed sale was "purely intrastate"
and that "formal 'passage of title' was not an adequate criterion for
measuring a state's constitutional power to tax sales made within the
State." 70  However, granting the truth of this assertion does not rule
68. In Brown v. Houston, 114 U.S. 622 (1885), a bargeload of coal held for sale
in New Orleans was taxed by the city. Subsequently, some of this coal was "exported"
on a foreign steamship (it appears that the ship itself used the coal rather than transport-
ing it for sale abroad). The tax was sustained as applied to the entire bargeload and
was not limited to the portion of the load sold domestically.
69. "The California Supreme Court conceded that the delivery of the oil 'resulted
in the passage of title and the completion of the sale, and the taxable incident.'" 329
U.S. at 84.
70. Id. at 88 (Black, J., dissenting). He continued:
Private parties are free to decide, so far as their own interests are con-
cerned, when legal title shall be considered to "pass." But a state surely is
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out an interrelationship between physical movement of the goods and
other factors, such as passage of title. In fact, state courts have held
that such interrelationships exist between the degree of physical move-
ment required for tax immunity and other factors, such as the necessity
to collect the goods at a port until a sufficient quantity is accumulated
to be shipped economically.
71
Even though actual movement of the goods to a foreign destina-
tion may have commenced, and the status of exports may have attached,
that status may be lost by an interruption in the journey, notwithstand-
ing that the interruption is beyond the control of the exporter. Such a
situation occurred in Joy Oil, in which gasoline destined for Canada
remained in storage for fifteen months because a change in the laws
necessitated use of another mode of transportation, and during that
time a tax was imposed. 72  The Court upheld the tax, stating:
It is of course true that commodities destined for shipment by
water must be transshipped at the water's edge and so may require
a brief period of storage at that point which will not be deemed
a delay sufficient to interrupt the continuity of the export process.
... But here the period of storage at Dearborn was so long as to
preclude holding that the first step toward exportation would in-
evitably be followed by others.
73
While the gasoline would have been exempt from taxation if it
had been promptly shipped out of the country, it lost its exemption
because the interruption in the journey was unduly lengthy. Joy Oil
is the most recent Supreme Court case dealing with an interruption of a
journey abroad. However, Empresa Siderurgica and Kosydar imply
that the classification of goods as tax exempt exports could survive
only a minimal interruption in the export process, even though circum-
stances beyond the exporter's control may have precluded resumption
of the export journey at an earlier time.74  The Court may have been
not required by the Constitution to forbear from taxing that part of a sales
transaction which precedes the particular moment the parties have arbitrarily
selected for a conceptual transfer of title.
Id.
71. See, e.g., Cargill of California, Inc. v. County of Yolo, 26 Cal. App. 3d 704,
103 Cal. Rptr. 259 (Ct. App. 1972).
Since the maximum production of export pellets from all sources was 450
tons per day, and a typical vessel at the Port of Sacramento could load 2000
to 2500 tons per day, a ship could not economically be loaded by direct daily
delivery. Instead, it was necessary to accumulate the pellets in the elevator
in anticipation of the arrival of one vessel per month for loading.
Id. at 706-07, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
72. See text accompanying notes 47-48 supra.
73. 337 U.S. at 288.
74. In both Empresa Siderurgica and Kosydar, the export exemption from state
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motivated partially by the belief that exports should "pay their own
way. '7r5  The Court must have considered the protection which the
state provided the gasoline during the period of storage at Dearborn
when it stated, "[tihe Export-Import Clause was meant to confer im-
munity from local taxation upon property being exported, not to re-
lieve property eventually to be exported from its share of the cost of
local services.
76
ANALYSIS OF PRESENT JUDICIAL APPROACHES
As recognized by Mr. Justice Holmes in Spalding, the principal
problem for the Court in export tax cases is determination of the point
beyond which goods are considered to be "exports" and therefore con-
stitutionally immune from state (or federal) taxation.77 Since its deci-
sion in Coe, the Court has held fast to the position that goods are not
"exports" until they have commenced movement abroad "in a con-
tinuous route or journey.' 78  Other tests, such as the owner's intention
ultimately to export the goods or the "objective" certainty of export
based on contract or manufacture to foreign specifications, have been
rejected by the Court."9  The question to be examined is what goals
and policies are furthered by the judicial approach the Court has chosen
to adopt.
Since the requirement of actual movement of the goods into the
stream of export before state tax immunity attaches is a relatively
"wooden or mechanistic"8 0 test, it is easily applied by the states.81 In
taxation is construed quite narrowly. The purpose of such construction appears to be
a judicial desire to preserve the states' power to tax to the maximum degree possible.
Thus, the taxed goods are held to be part of the "general mass of property" until the
last possible moment. If such an interpretation of judicial motivation is correct, then
it would follow that the slightest interruption in the export journey might be seized upon
by the Court as an opportunity to restore the states' power to tax. The Court took a
step in that direction in Joy Oil.
75. Cf. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
76. Joy Oil Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 337 U.S. 286, 288 (1949) (emphasis
added).
77. The question is whether the sale was a step in exportation ....
at w.iich, To answer it with regard to any transaction we have to fix a point
in view of the purpose of the Constitution, the export must be said
to begin. As elsewhere in the law there will be other points very near to it
on the other side, so that if the necessity of fixing one definitely is not re-
membered any determination may seem arbitrary.
262 U.S. at 68-69.
78. 116 U.S. at 517.
79. See Kosydar v. National Cash Register Co., 417 U.S. 62 (1974); Joy Oil Co.
v. State Tax Comm'n, 337 U.S. 286 (1949); Empresa Siderurgica v. County of Merced,
337 U.S. 154 (1949).
80. Kosydar v. National Cash Register Co., 417 U.S. 62, 71 (1974).
81. See text following note 57 supra.
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fact, physical movement of the goods is arguably the simplest test for
the states to apply, since such movement can usually be proved or dis-
proved by bills of lading and other transportation documents. The easy
applicability of the Coe physical movement test is underscored by the
small number of cases involving claimed tax immunity under the im-
port-export clause which have reached the Supreme Court. The Kosy-
dar Court stated that under the physical movement test the judicial
inquiry is a factual one.82 And, of course, factual disputes are gen-
erally simpler for judicial resolution than disputes of law. Ease of
applicability and of judicial resolution are worthwhile goals for a test
of tax immunity, and are consistent with the constitutional purposes
of the import-export clause.
The physical movement test allows state tax administrators and
taxpayers to know with certainty when goods become exempt from
taxation. "[lit is highly important, both to the shipper and to the State,
that it [tax immunity under the import-export clause] should be clearly
defined so as to avoid all ambiguity or question."83  As stated by
Holmes, "any legal standard must, in theory, be capable of being
known."8' 4 The Coe test is "capable of being known" ith certainty,
so it has some theoretical, as well as practical, validity.
The physical movement test does have disadvantages. Since the
test is mechanistic, it does not serve well in exceptional cases, such as
Kosydar and Joy Oil, in which factors beyond the exporters' control
prevent the taxed goods from entering or remaining in the stream of
exportation. In those cases if additional factors had been considered,
it is possible that "export" status and, therefore, tax immunity would
have been conferred on the goods. Perhaps with respect to export tax
immunity the Court considers that certainty of the constitutional stand-
ard should override any test that, though fairer, may require resolution
on a case-by-case basis. The Court thus far has opted for simplicity
and certainty in its test, and shows no inclination to alter its choice at
this point.,
5
Not only is the current test easy to apply, but its narrow range
of immunity from state taxation maximizes the amount of tax revenue
82. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
83. Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517, 526 (1886), cited with approval in Kosydar v. Na-
tional Cash Register Co., 417 U.S. 62, 71 (1974).
84. 0. HoLmEs, THE COMMON LAw 88-89 (Harvard ed. 1963).
85. See text accompanying note 56 supra. For a further discussion of tax goals
in relation to the export tax exemption, see Note, Import-Export Clause: A Blanket Pro-
hibition Misapplied, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 528 (1967).
19751
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
available to state governments. In tax cases under the commerce
clause, the Court has explicitly recognized that interstate commerce
must "pay its own way." 6 The Court has implicitly applied the same
rationale to cases arising under the import-export clause.87 Most forms
of state taxation, such as sales taxes or ad valorem property taxes, may
be assessed on exports. These taxes are essential to states' overall
revenue plans, but this fact does not permit states to tax exports in the
face of a direct constitutional prohibition. Although the import-export
clause was intended to prevent the states from taxing exports in a dis-
criminatory manner,8 its language is sufficiently broad to exclude all
taxation of exports. Even a nondiscriminatory state tax which falls
upon exports is constitutionally void regardless of how desperately
the taxing state needs the revenue therefrom and regardless of the
amount of services provided the taxpayer by the taxing state. Ex-
ports are exempt from taxation even though they are sufficiently linked
to the taxing state to satisfy fourteenth amendment due process require-
ments.8 9
The balancing problem faced by the Court appears to have been
greatest in Joy Oil Co. v. State Tax Commission,0 ° in which the goods
had initially entered the export stream but the journey abroad had been
interrupted by circumstances beyond the exporter's control. During
the interruption, the goods remained stored within the taxing state for
fifteen months and the state-supplied services (such as police and fire
protection) continued. The tax in question was a nondiscriminatory
ad valorem property tax. The problem facing the Court was whether
it was proper to allow goods, which were to be exported, to receive
substantial benefits from the state over an extended period of time with-
out being required to pay a portion of the state's cost of providing ser-
vices therefor. "The Export-Import Clause was meant to confer im-
munity from local taxation upon property being exported, not to relieve
86. "While it is true that a State may not erect a wall around its borders prevent-
ing commerce an entry, it is axiomatic that the founders did not intend to immunize
such commerce from carrying its fair share of the costs of state government in return
for the benefits it derives from within the state." Northwestern States Portland Cement
Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 461-62 (1959).
87. See note 75 and accompanying text supra.
88. See text accompanying notes 15-23 supra.
89. Even if goods to be exported have not yet entered the export stream, they are
exempt from state taxation under the fourteenth amendment if they lack a sufficient con-
nection with the taxing state. See Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Min-
nesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959); Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954); Note,
40 S. CAL. L. REV., supra note 85, at 538.
90. 337 U.S. 286 (1949).
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property eventually to be exported from its share of the cost of local
services."91 This analysis appears correct in light of the sectional con-
flict that led to the inclusion of the import-export clause in the Constitu-
tion.92 The Court in Joy Oil was in sympathy with the states' need for
revenue, and, in view of the historical roots of the import-export clause,
opined that a narrow range of immunity from state taxation was ap-
propriate.
In Kosydar, certain machines to be exported were stored within
the taxing state. Again, the state had provided services for which it was
fair to demand payment, and, as in Joy Oil, the Court defined "export"
narrowly so as to validate the state tax. However, it must be noted that
in Kosydar the inventory of parts from which the machines were manu-
factured had already been taxed, as had the total tangible assets in
Ohio of the corporate exporter. Thus, the state was already receiving
a large payment for benefits it was conferring on NCR.
In view of the various forms of taxation available to the state and
the many "taxable events" on which taxes may be levied, it is unlikely
that a broader interpretation of the constitutional tax immunity for
exports would plunge the states into destitution or bankruptcy. In fact,
a loss of revenue for this reason could be offset by an increase in the
corporate income tax. This would, however, affect the taxes paid by
exporting and nonexporting firms alike, and would result in the non-
exporting firms paying a higher proportion of the cost of state services.
The Coe test of intent plus physical movement for state tax im-
munity minimizes the prospect that nonexporting firms will pay dis-
proportionately higher taxes than exporting firms, but also may have
harmful effects for the United States in international trade. When the
Constitution was drafted in 1787, the United States was dependent upon
international trade. In fact, the defects of the Articles of Confedera-
tion concerning trade accounted, in part, for the need to replace the
Articles. The Framers felt that preventing the states from discriminating
against each others' exports and preventing Congress from favoring
sectional interests were the only protections the nation's international
trade required. As the United States expanded, developed its resources,
and industrial*ized, international trade became progressively less im-
portant. Isolationism flourished at a time when the nation was rela-
tively independent of foreign trade. Since World War II, international
91. Id. at 288 (emphasis added).
92. See text accompanying notes 8-24 supra.
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trade has risen in importance to the extent that it is now a major factor
in the economy.
Since exports are constitutionally exempt from federal and state
taxation, it is possible that manufacturers of goods for export may carry
less than their proportionate share of the tax burden compared to manu-
facturers of goods for domestic use. If exporters are relieved of certain
taxes by virtue of the import-export clause, then the states must raise
the lost tax revenue by increasing the burden on other taxpayers. This
reallocation of the tax burden forces manufacturers of goods for the
domestic market to subsidize a portion of the state services for manu-
facturers of exports. This, in turn, means that goods may be sold to
consumers abroad at a lower price, and may be more competitive in
the international market. It is obvious that the earlier in the manu-
facturing and shipping process the goods acquire the constitutional status
of exports, the greater the shift in the tax burden from exporters to
other taxpayers.
The fact that the import-export clause shifts the tax burden to some
extent may explain why the Court has narrowly construed the term
"export." The Court may wish to minimize this shifting, since no shift
was within the contemplation of the Framers. Perhaps the Court is
reluctant to shift tax burdens because this is traditionally a legislative
function. 93 While the competitiveness of American products in the
international marketplace is a proper subject for governmental policy,
the Court may feel that it is not the institution which should make such
policy. But regardless of its motivations, the Court's current approach,
while equalizing tax burdens, means that goods must be sold in the
international market at a higher price, and thus may be less competitive.
Beyond the aforementioned implications of the Court's approach,
an overriding consideration deserves attention. It is entirely possible
that the import-export clause has outlived its usefulness.
94  The in-
tense sectional rivalries that caused the clause to be included in the
Constitution no longer exist. In this era of air travel 5 the trade ad-
vantages and opportunities once enjoyed by the coastal states have been
greatly reduced. 96 Even in the absence of the import-export clause,
Congress would have ample power to prevent discrimination on the
93. See note 23 supra.
94. See Comment, 51 MmN. L. REv., supra note 36, at 157.
95. See Note, 40 S. CAL. L. REv., supra note 85, at 536.




part of "shipping" states by using the ever-expanding powers of the
commerce clause. Thus, the export businesses may no longer require
the protection of the import-export clause. Duties imposed by the
importing country are the important factor, and they are largely con-
trolled by treaties and agreements made under the aegis of the execu-
tive branch.
The present limited utility of the import-export clause supports
the narrow interpretation which the Court has placed on it. The circle
of tax immunity which encompasses the exported goods themselves is
quite small, but the circle covering the activities and processes of ex-
portation is almost nonexistent. "An article may be an export and
immune from a tax long before or long after it reaches the port. But
when the tax is on activities connected with the export or import the
range of immunity cannot be so wide."' 7
However, a possible area of remaining vitality for the import-export
clause is its prevention of state interference with the establishment of
a uniform national policy, the absence of which would affect interstate
as well as international trade. For example, if California were to tax
exports and New York did not, many producers would prefer to ship
the products from New York. American goods destined for Japan
would become more costly and less competitive in Japanese markets,
and adverse balance of trade problems might result. The import-
export clause, then, may engender a necessary uniform standard, and
perhaps the Court has chosen the better course by interpreting the tax
immunity narrowly.
CONCLUSION
The narrow scope the Court has consistently given to the tax
immunity provided by the import-export clause has produced a rea-
sonable balance between the goals of the Framers and practical con-
siderations. The nation was able to overcome the sectional rivalries
that plagued commerce under the Articles of Confederation. The ap-
proach now taken by -the Court provides state tax administrators a
relatively objective and easily applied test of tax immunity, and pro-
vides exporters and their attorneys an acceptable degree of certainty
as to the law. The test also preserves the states' taxing power over
goods "to be exported" for the maximum possible time. International
97. Id. at 514-15.
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trade is unencumbered, and the Court's test results in a minimum shift
of the tax burden toward nonexporting taxpayers. These advantages
seem to compensate more than adequately for any disadvantages caused
by the "wooden" or "mechanistic" nature of the test. Perhaps these
disadvantages are small in comparison with the benefits for the nation's
international commerce.
